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A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS THAT IS A 
GOVERNMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN 
Mark Tushnet* 
 
I take Mark Killenbeck’s “provocative” article as an 
occasion for some informal comments about what Korematsu and 
Trump v. Hawaii tell us about the saying, “a government of laws, 
not a government of men and women.”1  My basic thought is that 
the “not” in the saying has to be replaced “but also.”  And, in some 
sense we have always had to have known that the saying was 
wrong as stated.2  Whatever the laws are, they don’t make 
themselves.3  Nor do they administer themselves, nor interpret 
themselves.  Men and women appear at the stages of enactment, 
application, and adjudication.  So, for example, we know that 
legislators and high-level administrators can adopt policies that 
say nothing whatsoever about race—regulations about stopping 
cars to enforce safety regulations, for example—that police 
officers on the ground can apply discriminatorily.4 
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii show us a government of 
laws that is also a government of men and women can be infected 
at each stage, in quite complex ways, by the racism of those men 
and women even when they also acknowledge that the laws to 
which they are subject (and that they are making and interpreting) 
condemn racism.  Legal actors simultaneously deny and affirm 
that racism infects the law:  deny it when they focus on the 
“government of laws” part of the saying, affirm it when they focus 
on the “government of men and women” part. 
 
         *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law emeritus, Harvard Law School. 
1. See Benjamin Barr, A Government of Laws and Not of Men, WYLIBERTY (June 12, 
2014), [https://perma.cc/PM7U-A75D]. 
2. See Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (2020) 
(examining this proposition in detail with respect to the presidency). 
3. Even accounts of law that treat it as an emergent phenomenon of human actions not 
directed intentionally at law-creation still find its origins in human action, and natural law 
accounts that attribute valid or good law to a non-human Creator treat that law as a normative 
standard that is brought to ground by human action.  See Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s 
Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 656-59 (1997). 
4. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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Here’s one version of the problems facing Roosevelt (and his 
subordinates) and Trump (and his).  It is deliberately desiccated, 
drained of any of the real-world features, including emotions, 
associated with their decisions.  That’s going to be important in 
my overall argument, so I urge readers to set aside for the moment 
their understandable impatience with this version’s lack of 
realism. 
Both Roosevelt and Trump were making decisions under 
uncertainty, as economists say.5  Saboteurs and terrorists posed 
threats of uncertain degrees to United States national security.  
Neither president could be certain about the identity of those 
saboteurs or terrorists.  The best they could do is assign 
probabilities to categories (including of course a probability of 
zero to some), and they could have varying degrees of certainty 
about the probability assignments.  Roosevelt (hypothetically) 
might have assigned a probability of zero to the category 
“Swedish-Americans” with a high degree of confidence.  He 
couldn’t reasonably be charged with making a bad decision if we 
later discovered one or two Swedish-American saboteurs. 
And “he”—the attribution to Roosevelt rather than others 
will turn out to be important—might have assigned a high 
probability to the category “Japanese-Americans” with some 
confidence.  And, again, he might not reasonably be charged with 
making a bad decision if we later discovered no more than one or 
two Japanese-American saboteurs.  
The situation doesn’t change even if Roosevelt had evidence 
at hand suggesting that rather few saboteurs were likely to be 
found among that population.  He would have to assign a 
probability to the possibility that the evidence was incomplete or 
misleading.  After all, saboteurs who are effective do a good job 
of doing what they can to stay out of categories where suspicion 
reasonably attaches.6  You can do a formal analysis of decision-
making under uncertainty about the risks associated with different 
 
5. I note that the first steps of the argument that follows, and maybe more of them, 
apply to decision-making about policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Loïc Berger 
et al., Rational Policymaking During a Pandemic, 118 PNAS 1, 2 (2021), 
[https://perma.cc/QZ6J-W9BG]. 
6. The television series The Americans provides a nice example with embedded Soviet 
spies working at a travel agency.  The Americans (FX television broadcast Jan. 30, 2013-
May 30, 2018). 
2021 A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS 325 
categories and uncertainty about the quality of the evidence, but 
I think the point is obvious:  Roosevelt was trying to “regulate” 
the risk of sabotage, and by definition risks and evidence, 
including evidence about the circumstances under which the risks 
will be realized, are known only probabilistically. 
The large literature on racial profiling and social welfare tells 
us that barring decision-makers from using racial categories as a 
predicate for risk-regulation doesn’t always enhance social 
welfare.  A great deal depends upon what the (real) probability is 
that actions by people in the racial category will lead to the risk’s 
realization (in Korematsu, sabotage), the costs that the realized 
risk imposes, and the costs imposed by the regulation (removal 
from homes and confinement in concentration camps, as well as 
something like a “demoralization” cost to the entire population).  
In an uncertain world, I doubt that anyone could be confident 
about his or her own assessment of whether a specific form of 
racial profiling was welfare enhancing. 
As far as I can tell, there are only two ways to deal with all 
this.  You can rule out racial profiling entirely, acknowledging 
that doing so will sometimes reduce social welfare, or you can 
assign the decision about whether to allow racial profiling in the 
situation at hand to someone else and accept as authoritative 
whatever he or she decides.7  Whoever makes the decision is 
going to have to come up with some probabilities about risks and 
about the quality of the evidence at hand.  When judges get the 
assignment, as they do on constitutional questions in the United 
States legal system, one piece of evidence they have is the 
decision made by (in these cases) the President.  The familiar 
standards of review language describes the weight courts are to 
give to that piece of evidence.  
The foregoing offers the “government of laws” perspective 
on the problems underlying Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii.  It’s 
full of words like “might” and “could.”  A government of laws 
could make the decisions without engaging in racial or religious 
discrimination.  But, as I noted at the outset, the government of 
 
7. This is the enduring legacy of the legal process jurisprudential school, which, despite 
some long-standing and valid critiques, nonetheless offers important insights into how to go 
about thinking through both substantive and institutional questions about the law.  See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 964 (1994). 
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laws is also a government of men and women, and that’s  where 
problems arise. 
As I indicated, we know that facially neutral laws can be 
adopted for racially discriminatory reasons.8  Here racism appears 
at the enactment level.  We also know that facially neutral laws 
not necessarily adopted for racially discriminatory reasons can be 
administered in a racially discriminatory way.9  In these cases 
racism appears at the enforcement stage.  And, though courts are 
unsurprisingly reluctant to acknowledge the fact, facially neutral 
laws can be interpreted by judges in racially discriminatory 
ways.10  Here racism appears at the adjudication and law-
application stage.  I turn to examining Korematsu and Trump v. 
Hawaii using these categories. 
How the policies of interning Japanese-Americans and 
banning Muslim entry into the United States came into being 
brings out the role of men and women in a government of laws.  
As a matter of law, both policies were grounded in executive 
orders issued under the President’s signature.  
The actual president’s role in the two cases was different, 
though.  Roosevelt appears to have had no personal investment in 
the internment decision.  Whatever his subordinates came up with 
was fine with him:  curfew, interments, no internment, ending 
internment, extending internment, or something else.  In one 
sense we might say that he looked at the issue from the 
perspective of a government of laws:  if the things that might be 
true were true, the policies were justified, and he engaged in 
deferential review, so to speak, of what his subordinates did.  His 
subordinates were racists, and that’s what generated the policy.  
 
8. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Church of Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
9. See, e.g., peremptory challenge decisions such as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
82 (1986).  Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886), where the discriminatory 
enforcement led the Court to invalidate the underlying ordinance (perhaps inferring 
discriminatory motivation at the enactment stage). 
10. Clear examples are difficult to come by in the modern era at the United States 
Supreme Court, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision reviewed in Patterson v. 
Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935), applied a state procedural rule in a way that strongly 
supported an inference that that court was interpreting the rule for the racist purpose of 
ensuring that Powell’s conviction would be insulated from United States Supreme Court 
review.  See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 356 (1964) (holding, in the 
context of a civil rights demonstration, that the state supreme court had violated the due 
process clause by interpreting a state statute too broadly).   
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In contrast, Trump himself was the racist in Trump v. Hawaii; a 
fact that the Supreme Court struggled with.11  The challenge to 
the third executive order failed because the work Trump’s 
subordinates did was enough to cleanse the Order of any 
constitutional taint. 
One disturbing possibility then presents itself.  Perhaps the 
Supreme Court’s unstated view is that intentional racial 
discrimination at one part of the enactment process can be 
cleansed by actions at another part:  General DeWitt’s racism 
eliminated by Roosevelt’s indifference, Trump’s racism 
eliminated by the work of the Office of Legal Counsel. 
Why though might the Court take this position?  We might 
want to think of two forms racism can take, personal and systemic 
or institutional, and we could define systemic or institutional 
racism in two ways.  Personal racism is straightforward:  someone 
takes an action because he or she is motivated by racism.12  
Systemic racism might occur when a significant number of actors 
with influence over social outcomes are individually racist.13  
This is a purely subjective account of systemic racism.  An 
alternative is to say that systemic racism occurs when material 
and other social goods are distributed in such a way that a racial 
(or religious) minority receives an unjustifiably low proportion of 
them, without regard to the causal mechanisms producing that 
distribution.14  Subjective motivations might play a role, but they 
aren’t essential to the story.  I would describe the alternative as 
offering an objective account of systemic racism. 
 
11. For my more detailed explanation for that assertion, see Mark Tushnet, Trump v. 
Hawaii: “This President” and the National Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-
19 (2018). 
12. I think it’s not important for present purposes to define precisely what the 
subjective state of mind is.  It could be a desire to do something for the very purpose of 
causing disadvantage to the Black community, or for the purpose of causing more 
disadvantage to the Black community than to others; or a lack of interest in the question of 
what the action’s impact on the Black community will be; or (what might be the same thing) 
“selective indifference” to effects on the Black community.  See Ian H. Lopez, Institutional 
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 
1726 n.28 (2000) (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK 
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4-5 (1967)). 
13. See id. at 1799-1801 (considering “pick your friends” racism in grand jury 
selection). 
14. See Thomas Kleven, Systematic Classism, Systematic Racism: Are Social and 
Racial Justice Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 37 (2009). 
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With objective accounts, we can have a systemically racist 
government of laws because individual motivation doesn’t 
matter.  I’ve suggested that by cleansing the policies in 
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii of the racist motivations of 
General De Witt and President Trump, the Court vindicated the 
idea that we have a government of laws but in a way that allows 
critics to continue to fairly describe the policies as objectively 
systemically racist. 
At the same time though, we are a government of men and 
women.  In such a government, racism at the individual level will 
inevitably occur.  That’s clearest at the level of enforcement, 
when a police officer stops a motorist in part because the driver 
is Black.  There’s no reason to think that it can’t occur at the level 
of enactment or adjudication as well.15  
Now, though, we have to worry about the possibility that we 
have a systemically racist government in the first, subjective 
sense.  That occurs when lots and lots of decision-makers are 
individually racist.  And, in my view, that’s what we have in the 
United States. 
As it turns out, that’s also a view the Supreme Court once 
came quite close to expressing openly (and that view, I believe, 
lies near the surface of other Supreme Court opinions).  
Washington v. Davis rejected statutory and constitutional 
challenges to the District of Columbia’s use of a reading test for 
its police officers.16  Job applicants who failed the test argued that 
its use deprived them of equal protection because using the test 
had a more substantial adverse effect on the class of Black 
applicants than on the class of white applicants.17  The Court 
rejected the argument, holding that disparate effects that didn’t 
result from intentional (that is, subjective) racial discrimination 
were insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.18 
One reason Justice Byron White gave for this holding, 
though, might have implications for our understanding of the 
subjective version of systemic racism—that it occurs in a 
 
15. The simplest version would be where a majority of a legislature or a supreme 
court’s members were individually racist and acted on those views.  For an extensive analysis 
of this and other possibilities, see Fallon, supra note 7.  
16. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). 
17. Id. at 232-33. 
18. Id. at 245-46. 
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government of men and women where racism is widespread.  
Justice White wrote that a pure disparate impact test “would raise 
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of 
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that 
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black 
than to the more affluent white.”19 
There are two important and related moves here.  The first 
accurately notes that race is correlated with wealth.  In a nation 
where that’s true, a pure disparate impact test amounts to 
characterizing the nation as systemically racist in the second, 
objective sense.  What aspect of a test makes subjective 
motivation relevant though?  This is where the second move can 
be seen.  Such a test will also “raise serious questions about . . . a 
whole range of” policies when subjective, individual racism is 
pervasive.20  
We can see this concern at work in some reactions to the 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.  BLM begins by directing 
attention to the implementation stage within the criminal justice 
system and, in particular, to the way individual police officers 
deal with Black citizens.21 These seem to be acts of intentional 
discrimination.  They are so pervasive, though, that BLM expands 
its vision to encompass subjective, systemic racism (widespread 
individual, intentional discrimination).  It further expands its 
vision to encompass the objective when it brings the already 
existing challenges to mass incarceration into its purview.22  And 
at some point in this process—and probably before the final 
expansion—critics of BLM say, echoing Justice White, that the 
movement raises doubts about a whole range of criminal justice 
policies. 
BLM seems onto something, of course, especially at the 
implementation stage.  Individual, intentional discrimination 
there seems quite widespread.  That would mean that the reasons 
 
19. Id. at 248. 
20. Id. 
21. See About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, [https://perma.cc/MM38-59U2] (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2021). 
22. By this I mean that most accounts of mass incarceration don’t attribute it to 
individual acts of racial discrimination. 
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for refusing to accept a disparate impact test apply to an 
intentional discrimination test as well.23 
We can now understand why courts might try to develop the 
doctrine that individual discriminatory acts are unconstitutional 
in a way that accommodates Justice White’s concerns.  And that, 
I suggest, is what the “cleansing” approach does.  Overstating, but 
I think only a bit, if a court can tell the story about a challenged 
policy in which some actor with influence on the account didn’t 
have the prohibited intention, the action is constitutionally 
permissible. 
Reflect for a moment, though, on this.  Justice White’s 
concern has been criticized on the ground that it rests on the 
concern that, properly interpreted, the Constitution requires more 
justice than the United States can deliver.24  We are now at the 
third stage of the “government of laws.”  Judges—men and 
women—interpret the law.  They know that individual, 
intentional racial discrimination is pervasive, but they can’t 
acknowledge that fact because it would be too destabilizing.  
That’s why Korematsu was so disturbing to Chief Justice 
Roberts in Trump v. Hawaii; it showed that individual, 
intentional, racial discrimination could occur at the interpretation 
stage.  The problem, that is, wasn’t that General DeWitt was a 
racist, though he was.  The problem was that enough of the 
Supreme Court’s Justices were racists to generate Korematsu as a 
precedent.25  Repudiating Korematsu means either that all of the 
Justices were racists or that for some reason you can’t cleanse the 
opinion by locating some Justices who weren’t racist. 
Once that possibility is raised, though, you—that is, a 
Justice—need only a minimal level of self-awareness to begin to 
 
23. I note that a similar analysis seems appropriate in discussing the suggestion that 
the responses of the United States Capitol Police to the events of January 6, 2021, were 
racially discriminatory in that the police wouldn’t have responded similarly to a BLM 
demonstration that ended up seeking to invade the Capitol building. 
24. Justice Brennan used the phrase “too much justice” in his dissent in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . states that its 
unwillingness . . . is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would 
open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. . . . Taken on 
its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.” (citations omitted)). 
25. I put it this way rather than saying that “the Court” was racist because we’re dealing 
with individual-level intentions.  Professor Killenbeck provides direct evidence of some of 
the Justices’ racism.  See generally, 74 ARK. L. REV. __, __ (2021). 
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worry about the possibility that as then, so now.26  Maybe, you 
think nervously, what I’m doing now is affected by my own not-
yet-acknowledged racism or, only a bit less disturbing, by the 
racism of the colleagues I work with every day.27  That thought 
has to be pushed out of consciousness, of course.  That’s where 
all the doctrinal maneuvers in Trump v. Hawaii come in:  
cleansing, focusing on the scope of presidential power over entry 
into the United States, emphasizing that the policy’s targets were 
non-citizens. 
The thought lingers, though; put all the things the Court has 
built into the doctrine, especially Justice White’s worries about 
“too much justice,” and perhaps we can see the Court as a 
participant in constructing systemic racism in its second variant, 
where racist outcomes occur even though not enough people are 
themselves intentionally racist.28  Or, even more troubling, we can 
see the Justices as participants in constructing systemic racism in 
the first, widespread intentional discrimination variant.29 
 
 
26. Galatians 4:29 (Common English Bible) (“But just as it was then, so it is now also 
. . . .”).  I must note that not all of the Justices actually do have a minimal level of self-
awareness. 
27. For what it’s worth, I report my sense that Thurgood Marshall, an extraordinary 
personality, managed to deal with this phenomenon in a completely mature way. 
28. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
29. For my earlier presentation of reasons for this conclusion, see Tushnet, supra note 
11, at 7-12. 
